Crosswalk pair
ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO 9001, control by control
16 canonical controls in Keel’s library satisfy clauses of both ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO 9001. Implement each once, attach the evidence once, and it counts toward each standard. The overlap is the work you don’t repeat.
ISO/IEC 27001 counts as one of your plan’s paid frameworks, or from $39/mo as an add-on. ISO 9001 counts as one of your plan’s paid frameworks, or from $29/mo as an add-on. See plans and pricing.
The overlap
What the two libraries have in common
Every figure here counts canonical controls in Keel’s library, not clauses of either standard. Each standard’s own authored count is on its framework page.
16
Controls that satisfy both
Canonical controls that crosswalk to at least one clause of each.
84
In Keel’s library for ISO/IEC 27001
19% of them also map to ISO 9001.
43
In Keel’s library for ISO 9001
37% of them also map to ISO/IEC 27001.
51
Evidence artifacts expected
Across the shared controls, from Keel’s evidence guidance. Gathered once.
-
ISO/IEC 27001 19%
16 controls of 84 in Keel’s library for ISO/IEC 27001 also map to ISO 9001.
-
ISO 9001 37%
16 controls of 43 in Keel’s library for ISO 9001 also map to ISO/IEC 27001.
The mapping
Controls that satisfy both
Each row is one control in Keel’s library and the clauses it answers on each side. Do the work once; both columns are then evidenced by the same artifacts.
| Canonical control | ISO/IEC 27001 clauses | ISO 9001 clauses |
|---|---|---|
| Governance & Risk | ||
| Continual improvement Improvement of the management system is run as an activity with a record, not held as an intention. Opportunities are captured from everywhere they arise - audit findings, the results of measurement and evaluation, decisions out of management reviews, incidents and near misses, and suggestions from the people actually doing the work - and held in one place instead of in the meeting each came out of. Each is evaluated and either taken forward with an owner and a date or closed with the reason it was not, so a rejected idea is a decision rather than a silence. Once an improvement is made, its effect on the suitability, adequacy and effectiveness of the system is checked, so improvement is something that can be shown to have happened rather than asserted at the next audit. The routine execution of the work counts as a source in its own right: what the operational processes, procedures and activities themselves show while they are being run - the step that is always skipped, the check that never fires, the manual workaround everybody has quietly adopted - is captured on the same terms as a finding from an audit, because the people running a process daily see more of it than any evaluation does. Where the thing being improved is an AI system, the improvement activity is built into the system’s own update cycle and is measurable: an update carries the improvement it is meant to deliver and the measure that will show whether it did, checked afterwards rather than asserted, and interested parties - the people who operate the system, the people it is used on, and those who represent them - are engaged regularly as part of that cycle rather than consulted once at launch. The opportunities are not confined to the system: what the organization delivers is in scope too. Improving products and services to meet known requirements and to address needs and expectations that are coming rather than current, correcting, preventing or reducing undesired effects, and improving how the system itself performs are all determined and selected against as improvement opportunities, rather than run as three unrelated programs. And the standing question - what in the system’s suitability, adequacy and effectiveness should be improved next - is answered from evidence rather than appetite: the results of analysis and evaluation and the outputs of management review are considered together to decide whether there is a need or an opportunity that has to be addressed. | 10.1 | 10.1, 10.3 |
| Document & records control Documented information is created, approved, versioned, and controlled; records are retained and protected for a defined minimum period - measured from the document’s creation OR from the date it last was in effect, whichever is later, so a policy that stayed in force for years does not start its clock on the day it was written - and are available to the people who have to act on the procedures they describe. Documentation is reviewed on a schedule and updated when an operational, environmental or legal change has made the current version wrong. A change forced by law is documented and put into effect promptly, and where that legal change materially affects what the organization has published to individuals about how it handles their data, THAT NOTICE IS REVISED TOO, as part of the same prompt action rather than as a separate task left to whoever owns the notice. Any other change may be made at any time provided the revised version still complies and IS DOCUMENTED BEFORE THE CHANGE TAKES EFFECT - the record precedes the effective date, so a routine that documents changes in arrears does not discharge this. Records are protected for as long as they are kept, and against more than deletion: against loss, against destruction, against falsification, against being read by somebody with no entitlement to them, and against being released outside the organization without authority. The protection applied to a class of record is decided from the requirements attached to it - what the law, the regulator or the contract demands of that record type, and what it would cost if it were lost or altered - rather than from where it happens to be stored. Records are held so that a change to one is attributable and detectable rather than silent, the storage medium and format are chosen to remain readable for the whole retention period and the information is migrated before either stops being so, and the ability to retrieve a record intact is exercised rather than assumed. What the set of documented information consists of is itself a decision rather than an accumulation: it comprises the documented information the standard the system is built against explicitly requires, plus whatever else the organization determines is necessary for the system to be effective - and the second half is decided against the size of the organization and the kind of activity, product and service it deals in, the complexity of its processes, and the competence of its people, so a small organization is not judged against a large one’s binder and a large one cannot claim a small one’s. | 7.5, A.5.33, A.5.37 | 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3.1, 7.5.3.2 |
| Internal audit program A risk-based internal audit program evaluates conformity and effectiveness at planned intervals, and again when an environmental or operational change could have undermined what was last evaluated; each evaluation covers both technical testing and non-technical review of whether the documented policies and procedures are actually being met. The program itself is written down - how often audits run, what methods they use, who is responsible for them, what each one covers and how it reports - and nobody audits their own work, so a finding is an independent judgment rather than a self-assessment. The results of each audit go to the management responsible for the area audited, and the program and its results are retained as evidence that it ran. It rests on a documented assessment, authorization and monitoring policy with supporting procedures, issued to the roles it binds, owned by a named official, and reviewed and updated on a defined cadence. Independence is a property of the assessor and not only of the reporting line: assessments are carried out by assessors or assessment teams with no responsibility for what they are assessing and no stake in the result - internal to the organization but outside the area, or brought in from outside it - and the organization states what level of independence it requires before the assessment is commissioned rather than judging it afterwards. That independence extends to the ongoing case as well as the scheduled one: where controls are monitored continuously between audits, independent assessors monitor them too, so the periodic audit is not the only unbiased look the organization ever takes. What an evaluation produces is treated as an input to improvement and not only as a conformity verdict: the findings, the observations and the opportunities each audit identifies are recorded as improvements with owners and dates and carried into the organization’s improvement process, so an audit changes something rather than closing. Where a regime names the parties an assessment result must reach, such as a regulator, a certifying body or the customers the assessed service serves, the results go to those parties as well as to the management responsible for the area audited. | 9.2, A.5.35 | 9.2.1, 9.2.2 |
| Leadership commitment & accountability Top management is accountable for whether the management system works, and the accountability is exercised rather than asserted. It approves the policy and the objectives and satisfies itself that they fit the direction the organization is actually going in; it requires the system’s requirements to be built into how the business already runs rather than bolted alongside it; it makes sure the resources the system needs are available; it tells the organization why conforming to the system matters, in its own voice; it directs and supports the people whose work makes the system effective; it promotes improvement; and it backs other managers in exercising leadership over the parts of the system that are theirs. What it decided, when, and on what basis is recorded, so the commitment is evidenced by acts rather than by a signature on a policy. Leadership is accountable for cybersecurity risk itself and not only for the system that manages it, and it fosters the culture that has to go with that: risk-aware, ethical, and expected to keep improving rather than to hold a standard once reached. It also requires cybersecurity risk management activities and their outcomes to be carried inside the organization’s enterprise risk management process - the same register, the same reporting line, the same committee that hears the other risks - rather than in a security-only record that never reaches the people who allocate capital against it. It promotes two habits by name rather than by implication: the process approach, meaning the work is understood, run and improved as connected processes with defined inputs, outputs and owners; and risk-based thinking, meaning what could go wrong is considered while the work is being planned rather than after it has gone wrong. And it satisfies itself that the system achieves the results it was set up to achieve - the intended outcomes, checked - so leadership answers for the system’s effect and not only for its existence. | 5.1 | 5.1.1 |
| Management review Leadership reviews how the management system is performing at planned intervals and decides what to do about it: what will be improved, and what about the system itself has to change. Each decision leaves the review with a named owner and a date rather than as a sentiment in the minutes, the previous review’s decisions are picked back up at the next one so nothing is decided twice and never done, and the record of the review and its outputs is retained. The risk management strategy is one of the review’s standing subjects: what the strategy actually produced is reviewed for what it says about the direction being taken, and the strategy itself is then reviewed and adjusted for whether it still covers the requirements the organization is under and the risks on its register - so a strategy the year has overtaken is changed at the review rather than reaffirmed by it. The review is planned rather than convened, and what it has to consider is fixed in advance: the status of actions from previous reviews; changes in the external and internal issues that bear on the system; the satisfaction of customers and the feedback of other interested parties; how far the objectives set for the system have been met; how the processes are performing and whether what the organization delivers conforms; the nonconformities raised and the corrective actions taken; the results of monitoring and measurement; audit results; how external providers are performing; whether the resources the system has are adequate; the effectiveness of the actions taken on risks and opportunities; and the opportunities for improvement on the table. An input that is missing on the day is recorded as missing rather than passed over, so the review is answerable for what it did not see as well as for what it decided. Where the organization develops or uses AI, the AI governance program is a standing subject of the same review rather than a separate forum: what the AI systems in scope did, what the risks and impacts recorded against them showed, and what should change - taken with the rest of the agenda by the same leadership, so an AI decision is weighed against the organization’s other commitments instead of beside them. | 9.3 | 9.3.1, 9.3.2, 9.3.3 |
| Management system communication plan What the management system has to communicate is decided in advance and written down rather than left to whoever remembers: on what subjects, when, to whom inside the organization, to whom outside it, by whom, and by what means. The plan covers what goes out routinely - policy changes, objectives, how the system is performing, the obligations people are under, including what each part of the organization is responsible for in operating the system - and what goes out on a trigger, and it names who is authorized to speak externally so a communication that carries an obligation is not made by whoever picked up the phone. It is reviewed when the audience, the obligations or the system change, and what was communicated, to whom and when is recorded, so the plan can be shown to have been followed rather than merely written. Cybersecurity risk has its own named lines within that plan: which risks are reported upward and to whom, how a risk raised in one part of the organization reaches the other parts it affects, and how risk arising from suppliers and other third parties enters those same lines instead of staying inside the relationship that produced it. The plan covers the incident case too, so recovery activities and the progress made in restoring operational capability are communicated to the designated internal and external stakeholders on terms set in advance rather than on whatever the responders have time for. | 7.4 | 7.4 |
| Management system processes & interactions The management system is run as one connected set of processes rather than as a pile of separate activities that happen to share a binder. The processes it needs are identified, each with what goes into it and what comes out, the order they run in and how they hand off to one another, the criteria and methods that tell whether it is working, who owns it, and what it needs to run. The map is kept current as processes are added, merged or dropped, and it is used - improvement of the system is driven from it, and a change to one process is traced through to the processes it feeds - rather than drawn once for an audit and filed. The risks and opportunities each process carries are determined and addressed as part of defining it, so a process is designed against what could stop it delivering its intended output rather than only against how it runs when nothing goes wrong. The map is documented rather than held in someone’s head: the information needed to support the operation of the processes is maintained and kept current, and enough is retained from the running of them to give confidence they were carried out as planned - the second being a record of what happened, not a description of what should. | 4.4 | 4.4.1, 4.4.2 |
| Management system scope statement The boundaries of the management system are decided and written down as a scope statement: which parts of the organization, which locations, which activities, which information and which technology sit inside it, and what sits outside. The statement is reasoned from the issues determined about the organization’s context and from what interested parties require, rather than drawn to be convenient, and it states the interfaces and dependencies between what the organization does itself and what is done for it by others - so a boundary drawn around a service someone else runs is visible on the page instead of implied by its absence. The scope is available as documented information, and it is revisited when the organization, its activities, or those dependencies change. Those dependencies are understood and made known, not merely bounded: the outcomes, capabilities and services the organization relies on others to provide are named in the scope record along with what inside the organization depends on each, and the record is made available to the roles whose work assumes them - so a dependency is something the organization can point at rather than something it learns about when the dependency fails. The scope names the products and services it covers, not only the organizational units, because a boundary drawn around a division says nothing about which of its offerings the system is answering for. And where a requirement of the standard the system is built against is judged not to apply inside that boundary, the judgment is recorded with the reason it holds - which requirement, why it cannot affect the organization’s ability to deliver conforming products and services, and who decided - so an exclusion is an argument on the page rather than a silence in the scope. | 4.3 | 4.3 |
| Nonconformity & corrective action (CAPA) When something fails to meet a requirement, the first response is to contain it: the nonconforming output is controlled so it goes no further, what has already gone wrong is corrected, and the consequences of it are dealt with. Then the question of cause is asked - why it happened, and whether the same failure exists somewhere else or could happen somewhere else - and where the answer warrants action, that action is taken and tracked to closure. Each failure is rated for how serious it is and put in front of the people who actually have the authority to fix it, on a timescale set by that rating rather than by the next scheduled meeting - and where the rating warrants it, that includes senior management and the governing body. Afterwards the action is reviewed for whether it actually removed the cause rather than only for whether it was completed, the management system is changed where the review shows it has to be, and the nonconformity, what was done about it and the result of doing it are all recorded. Open findings are held in one plan of action rather than in the report each came from: a single tracked list carrying every weakness and deficiency the organization has found - from an assessment, an audit, a scan, a test, an incident or a report from outside - with the remediation intended for each, the milestones it will pass and the date it is due, updated as findings are closed and as new ones arrive rather than rebuilt at the next review. | 10.2 | 8.7.1, 8.7.2, 10.2.1, 10.2.2 |
| Operational planning & control The processes that deliver what the management system requires are planned before they are run and controlled while they run. The criteria each process has to meet are set in advance; the process is carried out to those criteria; and enough is recorded to give confidence afterwards that it ran as planned, rather than only that it ran. Changes to those processes are controlled: a planned change has its consequences considered before it is made, and an unintended change - something that drifted, broke or was worked around - is reviewed after the fact and acted on where it did harm. Processes, products and services provided from outside the organization but relied on inside it are brought within the same criteria and the same control, because a process that has been handed to someone else is still one the system depends on. Planning starts from what has to be true of the output: the requirements the products and services themselves must meet are determined before the processes that deliver them are designed, and the resources needed to achieve conformity to those requirements are determined alongside them - so a process is not planned to criteria it was never resourced to meet. | 8.1 | 8.1 |
| Organizational context The internal and external issues that bear on the management system are determined and written down: what the organization does and how it is structured, the technology and information it depends on, the people and culture inside it, and outside it the markets it sells into, the laws and contracts binding it, the threat environment it operates in and whatever else could affect whether the system achieves what it exists to achieve. Each issue is recorded with enough reasoning that a reader can see why it matters here rather than in general, and the record is revisited on a defined cadence and whenever something material changes - an acquisition, a new market, a new regulator, a new class of threat - so it is the current picture and not the one taken when the system was first set up. The mission the organization exists to carry out is stated as part of that record, in its own words rather than by implication, and the cybersecurity risk decisions taken under the management system are traced back to it - so a risk is prioritized for what it would do to the mission rather than for how alarming it sounds. | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| Planned change to the management system When the management system itself needs to change - its scope, its policy, its objectives, the processes it runs, the roles and authorities inside it, or the method by which it assesses risk - the change is carried out in a planned way rather than absorbed. Before it is made, its purpose and what it is likely to cause are stated; the integrity of the system while the change is in progress is considered, so it does not stop working half way through; the resources the change needs are identified and made available; and the responsibilities and authorities it moves are reallocated and communicated to the people gaining and losing them. The change, the reasoning and the approval are recorded, and afterwards the result is checked against the purpose the change was made for. | 6.3 | 6.3 |
| Resources for the management system The resources the management system needs in order to be established, run, kept running and improved are determined and provided, not assumed: the people and the time they are actually given rather than the time the plan says they have, the tools and technology, the information, and the budget. The determination distinguishes what the organization can meet from its own capability from what it has to obtain from outside, and it is written down so a shortfall is visible as a shortfall. It is revisited when the system’s scope, its workload or the organization changes, so a system that has grown is not still resourced for the size it was when it started. Security and privacy are budgeted as a discrete line rather than absorbed into a general technology allocation. The high-level security and privacy requirements for a system or a service are determined while the business process it serves is being planned, rather than after the design is fixed; what it will cost to protect it is then determined, documented and allocated as part of the organization’s capital planning and investment process; and that amount appears as a discrete line item in the programming and budgeting record - so an underfunded control is a visible decision rather than an unexplained gap. Adequacy is judged against the risk strategy rather than against last year’s allocation: what is provided is set commensurate with the risks the organization has said it will manage, the roles it has assigned and the policies it has issued - and where it is not, the shortfall is recorded against the part of the strategy it fails to fund. People are determined as their own class of resource rather than counted inside a budget line: the persons necessary for the system to be implemented effectively, and for its processes to be operated and controlled, are identified from the work that has to be done and are then actually provided - so a process with nobody assigned to run it is visible before it fails rather than after. Where the management system depends on data and on computing capacity - not only on people, tools and money - those are determined and provided as resource classes in their own right, so a system planned without the data it needs, or without the compute to run what it plans, is a visible shortfall rather than a later discovery. | 7.1 | 7.1.1, 7.1.2 |
| Third-party Risk | ||
| Third-party / vendor risk management Due diligence, contractual safeguards, and ongoing monitoring of vendors that handle your data: the agreement obliges the vendor to comply in its own right with the security requirements that apply to it - an absolute standard, not a promise to match whatever you happen to do - to pass those obligations down to any subcontractor it brings in BY ENTERING INTO a contract or equivalent written arrangement with that subcontractor rather than by merely requiring equivalent practice of it, and to report to you, within a stated time, security incidents it becomes aware of and confirmed breaches of your data. Where a contract is not the instrument available, an equivalent written arrangement carrying the same obligations discharges the duty. The same obligations, together with the separation that keeps a related organization out of data it is not entitled to, are written into the governing document of any other arrangement that puts your data in the hands of a sponsor, parent, affiliate or plan. Diligence is not confined to security where the relationship warrants more: for suppliers significant enough to matter, the organization states the standards of conduct it expects of them - how they behave commercially and how they treat the environment around their operations - and screens candidates and incumbents against those stated expectations as part of the same selection and monitoring cycle, rather than accepting a signature on a code as evidence of it. Where the vendor handles personal data, the agreement binds it to privacy obligations no weaker than the commitments the organization has itself made about that data - the purposes it may be used for, the limits on passing it on further, and the help the organization needs in order to answer the requests individuals make about it - and the reporting duty above reaches a suspected as well as a confirmed compromise of that personal data, on the same stated clock. Which requirements apply to a given supplier is decided by the TYPE of relationship rather than by one clause set issued to everyone - what data it touches, what access it holds, whether it can affect the organization’s own service, and what it would cost if it failed - and the requirements are agreed and recorded before access begins rather than negotiated after go-live. Once the relationship is running, what the supplier actually delivers is reviewed against what was agreed on a stated cadence: the service records, the security reports and assurance the agreement entitles the organization to, the incidents it has declared, and the findings of any audit or test right the organization holds - exercised rather than merely retained. A change on the supplier’s side is managed as a change rather than discovered - a new subcontractor, a new location or jurisdiction, a change of ownership, a material change to the technology or to the people delivering the service is notified in advance under the agreement, assessed for what it does to the risk, and approved or refused before it takes effect. ACQUISITION is governed as its own act, under a documented system and services acquisition policy with supporting procedures, owned by a named role and reviewed on a defined cadence. When a system, a component or a service is bought, the contract states the security and privacy requirements it must meet - the functional requirements, meaning what the controls have to do; the strength requirements; the assurance requirements, meaning what evidence the supplier must produce that they work; the documentation the supplier must deliver and how it must be protected and distributed; the description of the development environment and of the environment the product will run in; and the acceptance criteria the delivery is measured against - all stated in the solicitation before a supplier is chosen rather than negotiated after award, and all expressed in terms of the applicable laws and standards. The supplier is required to describe the functional properties of the controls it will implement, and to provide design and implementation information for those controls at a level of detail the organization has specified, so the organization can judge them rather than take their existence on trust. It is also required to identify the functions, ports, protocols and other services the delivered product intends to use in the organization’s environment - and, for an external service provider, the ones its service requires - so an integration does not open a path nobody asked for. The program has three artifacts of its own. An INVENTORY of service providers lists every one the organization knows of, records the classification given to it and names the person inside the organization who owns the relationship, and is reviewed on a defined cadence and whenever a change to the organization would alter it. A POLICY governs the whole cycle - how providers are classified, how the inventory is kept, how they are assessed, how they are monitored and how they are decommissioned - owned by a named role and reviewed on the same terms. And a CLASSIFICATION is applied to each provider against stated criteria such as the sensitivity and volume of the data it holds, the availability the organization depends on it for, the regulation that reaches it, and the risk that remains after the controls in place - reviewed rather than assigned once. DECOMMISSIONING is performed rather than allowed to lapse: when a relationship ends, the user and service accounts are deactivated, the data flows into and out of the provider are terminated, and the organization’s data held in the provider’s systems is disposed of and the disposal evidenced. Who does what is settled before the relationship starts and written down on both sides: the cybersecurity roles and responsibilities of the organization, of the supplier, and of the customers and partners the arrangement reaches are established, communicated to each of them and coordinated between them, so a duty is not left in the gap where each party assumed the other held it. Planning and due diligence come before the agreement rather than after it - what the relationship would expose, what the candidate’s security actually looks like, and what would have to be true before it starts are established while declining is still an option. The risk a supplier carries is then held as a record rather than as an impression: understood, written down, prioritized against the other suppliers, assessed on a stated cadence, responded to with an owner and a date, and monitored for the whole life of the relationship instead of at onboarding only. The provider inventory records the SERVICES each one actually provides as well as its name, so what the organization has placed outside itself is answerable from the list. Where a PROCESS itself is provided from outside, it stays inside the management system’s control rather than leaving it: the controls the organization intends to apply to the external provider and the controls it intends to apply to the resulting output are defined separately and both are applied, because a well-governed supplier can still ship a nonconforming output. What the arrangement could do to the organization’s own ability to consistently meet its customers’ requirements is considered when those controls are set, and the verification or other activity necessary to establish that what arrives meets requirements is determined in advance and carried out rather than inferred from the supplier’s own assurances. Where a regime requires the CHAIN OF CUSTODY of a device to be established before it enters the environment, the organization documents and maintains that custody, replacement devices included, so the integrity of what arrives is demonstrated rather than assumed. | A.5.19, A.5.20, A.5.22 | 8.4.1, 8.4.2, 8.4.3 |
| People & Culture | ||
| Competence management The competence each role in the management system needs is determined and written down, and the people in those roles are established as having it - on the basis of their education, training or experience rather than on the basis of holding the job. Where the competence is not there, something is done about it - training, mentoring, supervision, reassignment or hiring - and the action is afterwards evaluated for whether it produced the competence, not merely for whether it was delivered. The records that show all of this are retained. | 7.2 | 7.2 |
| Management-system awareness Everyone doing work under the organization’s control can say what the policy governing their work commits to, which of the objectives their own work affects, how what they do contributes to the management system working - including what improving it is worth - and what the consequences are when its requirements are not met. | 7.3 | 7.3 |
Beyond the pair
Where else this work counts
A framework is lit when a shared control above also maps to it. Unlit means none of them do, which is an absence rather than a judgment about that standard.
Also reached by these 16 controls
- AI Governance Essentials also reached
- Amazon Appstore Child-Directed Apps not reached
- Apple App Store Kids Category not reached
- CIS Critical Security Controls also reached
- COPPA also reached
- ESG Essentials also reached
- EU AI Act not reached
- FedRAMP 20x also reached
- FedRAMP Consolidated Rules also reached
- FedRAMP Rev5 Class B also reached
- FedRAMP Rev5 Class C also reached
- FedRAMP Rev5 Class D also reached
- GDPR also reached
- Google Play Families not reached
- HIPAA also reached
- ISO/IEC 42001 also reached
- NIST AI Risk Management Framework also reached
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework also reached
- NIST SP 800-171 also reached
- NIST SP 800-53 also reached
- PCI DSS also reached
- PIPEDA also reached
- SOC 2 also reached
- SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley) Section 404 also reached
- US Employment Law - Federal Baseline not reached
Nearby pairs
- ISO/IEC 27001 and FedRAMP Rev5 Class D 55 shared controls
- ISO/IEC 27001 and FedRAMP Rev5 Class C 53 shared controls
- ISO/IEC 27001 and NIST SP 800-53 52 shared controls
- ISO/IEC 27001 and NIST Cybersecurity Framework 45 shared controls
- ISO/IEC 27001 and FedRAMP Rev5 Class B 41 shared controls
- ISO/IEC 27001 and NIST SP 800-171 35 shared controls
The thesis
Why this is one project, not two
On a crosswalk-native model, ISO 9001 mostly lights up controls you already built for ISO/IEC 27001. You’re not re-uploading the same screenshot for a second audit. You apply the framework and see the genuine delta worth working. That’s the whole idea behind collect once, comply everywhere.
Next step
Add ISO 9001 to the work you already did
Apply both frameworks in one workspace and see the overlap measured against the controls you already hold.